Ken Aizawa Sample Publications

The Massive Multiple Realization of Psychological Properties (Draft)
MMR

Neuroscience and Multiple Realization: A Reply to Bechtel and Mundale
(Word document)
(Opendocument)

Multiple Realization and Methodology in the Neurological and Psychological Science. (Co-written with Carl Gillett)
(Word document)
(OpenDocument)

The (Multiple) Realization of Psychological and other Properties in the Sciences. (Co-written with Carl Gillett) (Forthcoming). Mind & Language.
(Word document)
(OpenDocument)

Levels, Individual Variation and Massive Multiple Realization in Neurobiology (Co-written with Carl Gillett) (Forthcoming) Bickle, J. (Ed.) Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience.
(Word document)
(OpenDocument)

Defending the Bounds of Cognition (with Fred Adams). (Forthcoming) In Menary, R., The Extended Mind, Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. Submission invited by Richard Menary. Andy Clark has written a reply to this paper that will appear in this collection. (September 2003 draft)
(Word document)
(OpenDocument)

Why the Mind is Still in the Head. (with Fred Adams) (Forthcoming). Invited contributed to The Cambridge Handbook on Situated Cognition. Edited by Philip Robbins and Murat Aydede. (April 15, 2005 Draft)
(Word document)
(OpenDocument)

Embodied cognition and the extended mind. (with Fred Adams). (Forthcoming). In Garzon, P., & Symons, J. Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology.

Causal Theories of Mental Content, (with Fred Adams), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Forthcoming)

Walter Pitts and "A Logical Calculus" (with Mark Schlatter) (2007) Synthese, 162, 235-250.

Warren Sturgis McCulloch, (2007). Entry for The New Dictionary of Scientific Biography.

Korbinian Brodmann, (2007). Entry for the The New Dictionary of Scientific Biography.

The Bounds of Cognition. (With Fred Adams) Blackwell Publishers. (2007)

The Biochemistry of Memory Consolidation: A Model System for the Philosophy of Mind (2007). Synthese, 155, 65-98.

Understanding the Embodiment of Perception (2007) Journal of Philosophy, 104, 5-25.

Defending Non-Derived Content (with Fred Adams). Philosophical Psychology, 18, 661-669. (2005).

Cognitive Architecture: The Structure of Cognitive Representations. Warfield, T., and Stich, S., Blackwell's Companion to the Mind. (2003). pp. 172-189.

The Systematicity Arguments. (2003). Kluwer Academic Publishers.

The Bounds of Cognition (2001) (with Fred Adams). Philosophical Psychology, 14, 43-64.

Connectionist Rules: A Rejoinder to Horgan and Tienson's Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. Acta Analytica, 22, 59-85. (1999).

Rock Beats Scissors: Historicalism Fights Back. (with Fred Adams). Analysis, 57, 273-281. (1997)

Fodor's Asymmetric Causal Dependency Theory and Proximal Projections. (with Fred Adams) Southern Journal of Philosophy, 35, 433-437. (1997)

Explaining Systematicity. Mind and Language, 12, 115-136. (1997)

Exhibiting versus Explaining Systematicity: A Reply to Hadley and Hayward, Minds and Machines, 7, 39-55. (1997).

The Role of the Systematicity Argument in Classicism and Connectionism. In O'Nuallain, S. (Ed.). Two Sciences of Mind: Readings in Cognitive Science and Consciousness. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: John Benjamins. (pp. 197-218). (1997).

The Gap between Science and Social Policy in The Bell Curve. American Behavioral Scientist, 39, 84-97. A special issue on "The Bell Curve: Laying bare the resurgence of scientific racism," edited by Robert Newby. (1995).

Some Neural Network Theorizing Before McCulloch: Nicolas Rashevsky's Mathematical Biophysics. In Mira-Mira, J., (Ed.). Proceedings of the International Conference on Brain Processes, Theories, and Models. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (pp. 64-70). (1995).

Representations without Rules, Connectionism, and the Syntactic Argument. Synthese, 101, 465-492. (1994).

Lloyd's Dialectical Theory of Reference. Mind & Language, 9, 1-24. (1994).

Fodorian Semantics. (with Fred Adams) In Warfield, T., & Stich, S. (Eds.). Mental Representation: A Reader. (1994). (pp. 223-242).

"X" means X: Fodor/Warfield Semantics. (with Fred Adams) Minds and Machines, 4, 215-231. (1994).

Fodorian Semantics, Pathologies, and Block's Problem. (with Fred Adams) Minds and Machines, 3, 97-104. (1993).

Connectionism and Artificial Intelligence: History and Philosophical Interpretation. Journal for Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence2, 4, 295-313. (1992).

'X' means X: Semantics Fodor-Style. (with Fred Adams) Minds and Machines, 2, 175-183. (1992).

Rules in Programming Languages and Networks. (with Fred Adams and Gary Fuller) In J. Dinsmore (Ed.). The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. (1992). (pp. 49-67).

Biology and Sufficiency in Connectionist Theory. In J. Dinsmore (Ed.) The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. (1992). (pp. 69-88).